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and Institutional Anomie Theory1
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Abstract. The present research put forth an integrated theoretical framework aimed at providing a more holistic community-level approach explaining crime across a heavily populated Latino city. Guided by social disorganization and
institutional anomie theory, this study used several data sources and OLS regression techniques to examine the impact
of social disorganization, economic and noneconomic institutional characteristics on rates of property and violent
crime across 1,016 census block groups in San Antonio, Texas. While several findings emerged, interactions between
alcohol density and concentrated disadvantage were significant and positively associated with property and violent
crime. Interactions between welfare generosity and concentrated disadvantage were significant and negatively associated with the outcomes.
Keywords: social disorganization; institutional anomie; Latinos; crime; interaction terms; census block groups
Introduction
For more than half a century, research in the
ecological tradition has been dominated by social
disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay, 1942). This
theory posits that adverse community characteristics such
as poverty undermine levels of informal social control,
which, in turn, fosters crime in urban settings (Sampson
and Groves, 1989). While social disorganization scholars
are credited with explaining why crime occurs across
different aggregates, a common limitation is that most
studies have been conducted in settings absent large
Latino populations.
Still working in the ecological tradition, a small
number of social scientists have recently enlisted institutional anomie theory to study economic (e.g., Gini
index) and noneconomic (e.g., participation in religious
engagements) institutional effects on crime (e.g., Maume
and Lee, 2003). Developed by Messner and Rosenfeld
(1994), institutional anomie claims that communitybased economic institutions elevate normlessness (i.e.,

anomie) which produces higher rates of criminal activity;
however, noneconomic institutions hold the capacity to
buffer anomic-fueled economic effects on crime. While
this theory is able to adjust for a wider array of institutions, the drawback is that studies are conducted at a
relatively high level of aggregation (e.g., nations, states,
counties), which limits consideration of community-level
attributes.
Despite these shortcomings, the role of social
disorganization and institutional anomie are salient
when placed in the context of the systemic network
thesis. According to Bursik and Grasmick (1993; see
also Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Kornhauser, 1978),
all kinds of community and institutional components
are part and parcel of the private, parochial, and public
systemic network that represents different levels of social
control. The systemic model posits that a broad range of
community and institutional characteristics affect crime
indirectly through their effect on informal social control.
To further illustrate this point, Wilson’s (1987) seminal
work depicted how macro-structural antecedents (e.g.,
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deindustrialization) impacted the larger institutional fabric of the community—fewer supportive institutions such
as churches and family stores—which further influenced
localized social pathologies (e.g., female-headed households, unemployment, criminals) that undermined the
development of community oversight. Peterson, Krivo,
and Harris (2000) argued that impoverished communities also experience difficulty attracting and maintaining
institutions that impede criminal behavior. The decline of
supportive institutions may consequently attract unconventional crime-inducing institutions, such as bars, due
to little business competition and low rents (Chung and
Myers, 1999; Lee, 1998).
While the ecological-crime causal relationships is
difficult to simplify, the current integrated theoretical
framework aimed to provide a more informed understanding of the wide range of community demographics
and institutions that act independently and interdependently (via interaction terms) to influence crime. Guided
by social disorganization and institutional anomie theory,
this study examined the impact of social disorganization
(concentrated disadvantage), as well as economic (pawnshops/music CD-exchange stores, alcohol outlets) and
noneconomic (welfare generosity, church membership
rate, Latino culture, voter turnout rate) institutional characteristics on rates of property and violent crime across
census block groups in San Antonio, Texas.
San Antonio was selected as the study site based on
the general omission of Latinos in the criminological
literature, its large Latino population, and the manner in
which this population is related to some of the institutions
of interest. The city has a 58 percent Latino population,
yet this ethnic group is predominantly of Mexican origin,
native-born, disadvantaged, and less educated. In terms
of additional Latino specific demographics, Latinos account for 23 percent of those living in poverty (city 16%),
18 percent of female-headed households (city 15%), 8
percent on public assistance (city 9%), and 8 percent with
a bachelors degree or higher (city 13%). These figures
indicate that Latino communities are more disadvantaged
than the rest of the city. By all accounts, San Antonio is
an acculturated city. The 2000 U.S. Census revealed that
only 5 percent of the Latino population is foreign-born,
and 15 percent reported speaking English less than very
well. Despite such acculturation, the Latino population
shows patterns of ethnic enclaves. According to Allen
and Turner (2005), 78 percent of Latino population is
residentially concentrated, but not shaped by immigration
when compared to other urban areas (e.g., Houston and
Los Angeles) with modest to large numbers of Latinos.
Latino demographic characteristics may shape sur-
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rounding economic and noneconomic institutions. For
example, over 871,000 individuals registered to vote
during the 2000 Presidential election and approximately
48 percent participated. However, Spanish surnames
accounted for twenty-three percent of the voter turnout.
One plausible explanation for the low ethnic turnout is
the poor and less educated population. Although San
Antonio’s legacy is rooted in Catholicism, the Glenmary
Research Center and San Antonio Catholic Archdioceses
show that from 1990 to 2000 Catholic congregations
decreased by 32 percent. Hunt (2000) reported that the
Catholic Church is losing Latinos to other religions. In
2003 the city also experienced a reduction in Section 8
housing vouchers which caters to a large Latino population. The San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA)
currently has over 11,000 residents receiving aid, with a
waiting list surpassing 5,000. While it appears that institutional features of San Antonio likely to help Latinos are
declining (or are weak), other institutions adversely influencing Latinos have increased. For instance, the city’s
business/assumed names records revealed that 44 new
pawnshops were established between 1999 and 2003, and
alcohol serving institutions continue to grow. Similar
to other large urban cities, much of the institutions considered to undermine pro-social values of restraint and
conformity are located in and around Latino communities. In the end, San Antonio is distinctive from other
large urban cities due to its large, disadvantaged, working, poor, native-born, Mexican-American communities
that tend to be residentially concentrated in areas with
declining political, religious, and welfare institutions and
increasing crime-inducing institutions.
Overall, the unique research setting of San Antonio
provided a rare exposé into community and institutional
arrangements of a predominantly Mexican-American
Latino urban landscape. Given the rapid growth of this
ethnic group, it is plausible that other urban cities will
increasingly come to resemble San Antonio (Guzman,
2001). Such locales are likely to be associated with
unique Latino experiences, as well as various structural
constraints that have plagued this ethnic group. This study
follows Martinez’s (2002) pioneering research, advocating for criminology that examines the Latino experience
with the goal of moving beyond the White/Black urban
crime focus.
Literature Review
The literature review is divided into three subsections. The review begins with social disorganization, followed by a discussion on institutional anomie and vari-
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ous competing noneconomic and economic institutional
dimensions. The final subsection provides an overview
of institutional anomie’s moderating concept and existing
empirical studies.
Social Disorganization
In their classic work, Shaw and McKay (1942)
reported that socially disorganized urban communities
characterized by residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and low socioeconomic status were associated with
crime. Over the years, theoretical adjustments have been
articulated and elaborate poverty measures were developed to better understand the changing social ecology of
crime across urban settings (see, Duncan and Aber, 1997).
For example, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997;
see also Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001;
Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson, Morenoff,
and Earls, 1999) found that high levels of concentrated
disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and residential
instability were positively related to violence at the census tract level. Collective efficacy was also reported to
attenuate the effects of concentrated disadvantage and
residential instability on violence. In related studies estimating the influence of social disorganization predictors
on rates of burglary, researchers found similar direct and
mediating results (Lynch and Cantor, 1992; Miethe and
McDowall, 1993; Rountree, Land, and Miethe, 1994;
Sampson and Groves, 1989; Smith and Jarjoura, 1989).
Another social disorganization condition that has
been extensively studied is population turnover (e.g.,
Browning, Feinburg, and Dietz, 2004; Morenoff et al.,
2001). Consistent with Wilson’s (1987) conception of
social isolation effect, areas with depleted populations
may experience higher crime rates due to: (a) an exodus
of the upper and middle class and (b) citizens who lack
resources to move choose not to participate in regulating
community behavior. Morenoff et al. (2001) found a significant negative association between population density
and homicide across Chicago census tracts. Based on
Wilson’s conception of social isolation, Morenoff et al.
(2001:539) contend that a negative association is more
applicable at the community-level, whereas a positive
association is expected at the city-level. Browning et al.
(2004) and Morenoff and Sampson (1997) also discovered
similar inverse relationships. Furthermore, disorganized
communities may attract negative, unconventional institutions, such as alcohol outlets. Kornhauser (1978:79)
emphasized the need to focus on the larger institutional
characteristics of communities as a way to more effectively realize community normative order. Others have

recently endorsed this line of inquiry (Hunter, 1985;
Peterson et al., 2000; Wilson, 1987).
Institutional Anomie and Competing
Noneconomic and Economic Institutions
By shifting focus to the institutional arrangement
of communities, integrating institutional anomie into
the current theoretical argument is applicable. Messner
and Rosenfeld (1994) revised Merton’s (1938) anomie
perspective by shifting the foci to noneconomic institutions. This shift provided the essence of their perspective; namely, that Merton did not (a) account for anomie
generated by a heavy reliance on economic institutional
opportunities and (b) consider noneconomic institutions
as a way to reduce anomie and crime. Scholars argue
that institutional anomie is suitable to explain macrolevel rates of violent and property crime (Messner and
Rosenfeld, 1994:68; see also Messner and Rosenfeld,
2001:42; Savolainen, 2000).2 At the center of institutional
anomie are two competing dimensions -- noneconomic
and economic institutions -- assumed to influence the
regulatory capacity of communities.
On one hand, noneconomic religious, political,
welfare, and Latino cultural institutions are considered
convention-inducing agents that foster mechanisms
of community social control and invoke conformity.
Researchers, for example, have posited that the social
ecology of religious institutions is important in establishing cultural norms, values of conformity, moral communities, and communal goals (Messner and Rosenfeld,
1997:74; Bainbridge, 1989; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993;
Stark, 1996:164; Stark, Bainbridge, and Crutchfield, 1983;
Warner, 1993). An additional source of noneconomic
institutional social control is the local political landscape.
Putnam (2000) has identified voting as a key component
of political social capital. More recently, Rosenfeld,
Messner, and Baumer (2001; see also Messner, Baumer,
and Rosenfeld, 2004) noted that social capital can be theoretically linked with crime by drawing on institutional
anomie’s heritage, because communities characterized by
higher levels of political participation can influence the
strength of community normative order.
While measures of poverty or some derivation
thereof (e.g., concentrated disadvantage) have long been
associated with crime, some researchers posit that welfare institutions can reduce crime by wealth redistribution (Benoit and Osborne, 1995; Eaton and White, 1991).
More specifically, Zhang (1997) examined the effect of
cash and in-kind welfare programs on criminal behavior
based on the theoretical notion that programs can reduce
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crime. He reported that public housing programs had
a significantly negative effect on property crime when
compared to Medicaid and school lunch programs.
Goering and Feins (2003) and Sampson, Morenoff, and
Raudenbush (2005) have recently advocated the use of
housing vouchers to aid the poor in securing residence in
middle class neighborhoods as a way of reducing crime
in impoverished areas.
In his pioneering community-level analysis on Latino
homicides across five U.S. cities, Martinez (2002:134)
concluded that Latino immigrant communities create a
buffer zone against crime by exhibiting higher levels of
social (e.g., families, friends, church) and economic (e.g.,
work and schools) institutional integration. This study
extends a similar argument: communities that preserve
the Latino culture in terms of Spanish language will also
buffer against crime. The Latino culture is commonly
conceptualized as the process whereby change (e.g., language, behavior, norms) occurs among immigrant populations (e.g., Latinos) due to exposure to and interaction
with a cultural system (e.g., American) that is different
from the culture of origin (Anderson and Rodriguez,
1984; Rogler, Cortes, and Malgady, 1991). Just as “immigration reinforces the cultural attributes of Latinos by
intensifying the use of Spanish” (Martinez, 2002:39),
Spanish speaking Latinos are more likely to reside among
immigrants, because embedded in language is knowledge
of customs, accesses to cultural groups, and its respective
artifacts (Vega and Gil, 1998:128). Therefore, Latino
communities characterized by a dominance of the English
language are likely to be associated with crime, because
native cultural attributes (e.g., Spanish language) are replaced by norms associated with the “American Dream”
of material wealth. With this said, only one study has
investigated acculturation as a contextual characteristic of communities. Using U.S. Census data, Finch et
al. (2000) operationalized aspects of acculturation as
household linguistic isolation and found that higher levels of community acculturation had a direct relationship
with the prevalence of substance abuse among pregnant
Latinas.3
On the other hand, economic institutions, such as
bars, are likely to obstruct the development of community normative order. For example, Peterson et al.
(2000) relied upon physical street addresses of select
unconventional institutions to investigate whether local
institutions matter for controlling neighborhood violence
and found that bars, economic deprivation, and residential instability contributed to an increase in violent crime
across census tracts. Interestingly, they also reported that
the presence of recreation centers reduced violent crime
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in most economically disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Alaniz, Cartmill, and Parker (1998; see also Roncek
and Bell, 1981; Roncek and Maier, 1991; Roncek and
Pravatiner, 1989; Quimet, 2000) conducted a similar
study at the block group level across three California
communities and reported that violence was a function
of alcohol availability and percent divorced. Although an
understudied topic, researchers have empirically shown
that pawnshop institutions also influence crime (Wright
and Decker, 1993; Fass and Francis, 2004). Glover and
Larubbia (1996) posited that pawnshops are counter-productive toward establishing normative order because they
attract “easy money” criminals.
Institutional Anomie’s Moderating
Concept and Existing Empirical Studies
Institutional anomie theory claims that the various
types of competing institutional dimensions matter most
when examined in tandem. In other words, it is the
interaction among economic and noneconomic institutions that produces the driving institutional balance of
power concept characterized by Messner and Rosenfeld
(2001:68). Thus, institutional anomie is considered a
moderating theory of crime studies (Maume and Lee,
2003).4 Institutional anomie’s unique contribution, then,
is that it emphasizes “the relative strength [interaction]
between [economic and noneconomic] institutions in
terms of the social structure” (Savolainen, 2000:1002;
see also Bernburg, 2002:731; Messner and Rosenfeld,
1997:1408). Put differently, an expansion of economic
opportunities is likely to reduce rates of crime only when
coupled with a strengthening of noneconomic institutions
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001:101; see also 1994:6890).
Institutional anomie has remained understudied when
compared to other ecological theories; but recent empirical tests have emerged. Chamlin and Cochran (1995)
showed the effects of economic deprivation on property
crime were significantly lower across states with higher
levels of church membership and percent voting while the
effects of economic deprivation on property crimes were
significantly higher across states with elevated levels of
divorced families. Savolainen (2000) reported nations
with generous welfare programs experienced reduced
negative effects of economic inequality (Gini coefficient)
on homicides. Maume and Lee (2003) estimated the influence of economic pressures (Gini coefficient) and five
noneconomic institutions (political voter turnout, familial
divorce rate, educational expenditure, civically engaged
religious denominations, and welfare expenditure) and
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found that the interaction between welfare expenditure
and Gini was the only term to significantly moderate the
effect of Gini on homicides across 454 counties.5
In summary, the literature indicated that diverse types
of crime across various geographical aggregates can be
explained using social disorganization and institutional
anomie theory. The theoretical difference is one mainly
of emphasis -- the former aims at explaining direct and
mediating influences while the latter aims at explaining
moderating influences. With this said, whether the community and institutional fabric of San Antonio influences
crime remains an open empirical question.
Research Objectives
The present research put forth an integrated theoretical framework aimed at providing a more holistic community-level approach explaining crime across a heavily
populated Latino city. Toward this end, social disorganization and institutional anomie should be viewed as
supplementary, rather than competing, theoretical frameworks. Three research objectives sought to (1) determine
direct social disorganization effects on the outcomes, (2)
better understand the effects of various institutional characteristics on crime, and (3) discover whether the effect
of concentrated disadvantage on crime depends on the
level of economic and noneconomic institutions. To accomplish these objectives, several contextual multivariate
models were estimated, because community institutions
will vary with respect to their ability to impose values of
restraint and control (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001:79).
Data and Variables
Several independent data sources were culled to
construct the data file: (1) 2000 Census Bureau, (2) Texas
Alcohol Beverage Commission (TABC), (3) San Antonio
Police Department (SAPD), (4) Bexar County Elections
Department, (5) San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA),
(6) San Antonio Catholic Archdiocese, and (7) other
public information. The following subsections highlight
these data sources, along with the collection and measurement procedures.
The first source of data was the 2000 Census
Bureau. This source was used to carry out two broad
functions. The first function was to identify the unit
of analysis -- San Antonio’s 1,016 census block groups
(BGs). Smaller geographic aggregates, such as BGs, may
yield greater effects due to distinct homogeneous communities (McNulty and Holloway, 2000; Peterson et al.,
2000; Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz, 1986; Quimet, 2000;

Warner, 2003; Wooldredge, 2002). As described in the
variable section below, the second function was to use
the Census Summary Tape File 3 (STF 3) to help identify
an array of community and institutional items at the BG
level.
The second data source was the Texas Alcohol
Beverage Commission (TABC). Consistent with prior
research that collected alcohol outlet data (Alaniz et al.,
1998; Gyimah-Brempong, 2001; Nielsen and Martinez,
2003; Peterson et al., 2000), the current study secured a
list of over 1,400 “on-site” alcohol serving institutions
(e.g., restaurants, bars, pubs, clubs) from 2001-2002. The
TABC provides information to the public via the Internet
in a downloadable version. The data included each institution’s physical street address. This made it possible to
geocode each institution within San Antonio.
Third, the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD)
provided official violent (e.g., robbery) and property
(e.g., residential burglary) crime incident records for
calendar years 2001-2003. At least three years of crime
data is considered adequate to avoid annual fluctuations
and increase the likelihood of having sufficient incidents
to calculate reliable rates (Messner and Golden, 1992;
Peterson et al., 2000; Sampson, 1985, 1987). The SAPD
data included attributes of the criminal event, such as
date, time, incident address, and incident type. The address where the incident occurred was geocoded to its respective BG. The SAPD also provided physical locations
of pawnshop and music CD-exchange stores. According
to SAPD, there were 96 pawnshops and 30 music CDexchange stores. To ensure data quality, information was
crosschecked using the Bexar County public records and
yellow page directory.
The fourth data source was election voter turnout
information obtained from Bexar County Elections
Department. This department collects vital information,
such as the physical street addresses of those who voted
in a particular election. During the 2000 Presidential
election, over 415,000 votes were cast by residents of San
Antonio.
The fifth data source consisted of 2000-2003 San
Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA) Section 8 housing
voucher information. These data provided the physical
address of the Section 8 home where the client resided and
the amount of the monetary stipend the renter received to
help pay for housing. From 2000-2003, SAHA provided
monetary voucher assistance to over 11,500 clients.
The sixth data source was 2002 church location
and membership information. Using the Internet, Bexar
County public records, San Antonio Catholic Archdiocese
official records, and yellow page directory, church loca-
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tions and membership information was collected. Once
a church was identified, church staff were contacted and
asked to provide the physical street address and number of
church members per congregation. San Antonio has over
650 Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, Presbyterian, Episcopal,
and Christian churches serving over 500,000 adherents.
All data were geocoded to their respective BGs, producing an analysis file of 1,016 BGs. Population sizes
for the BGs ranged from 226 to 4,292 individuals, with a
mean population of approximately 1,400.
Dependent Variables
Two general categories of crime rates were specified as the dependent variables. Violent crime rate was
operationalized as the three-year (2001-2003) average of
homicide, rape, robbery, and assault (simple and aggravated) in each BG per 1,000 residents. Property crime
rate was measured as the three-year (2001-2003) average
of serious property crime (auto theft and residential/vehicular burglary) in each BG per 1,000 residents. To
reduce skewness and induce homogeneity in error variance, violent and property crime rates were transformed
to natural logarithms.
Social Disorganization and Economic
Institutional Independent Variables
Social disorganization and economic institutional
predictors were assumed to obstruct the development of
community normative order. Concentrated disadvantage
was operationalized as a weighted factor regression score
(eigenvalue = 2.85, factor loadings > .8) that included the
following 2000 Census items: percent poverty, percent
unemployment, percent female-headed household with
children, percent Latino, and to a lesser extent, percent
Black. San Antonio is 58 percent Latino with a relatively
small African-American (6%) population. Concentrated
disadvantage represented economically disadvantaged
BGs to which Latinos and single parent families were
concentrated. Percent units vacant represents the proportion of untended housing units within each BG. Percent
male 15-29 years of age was operationalized using 2000
census data. These three variables were hypothesized to
be positively associated with violent and property crime
outcomes. The final social disorganization determinant,
population change, was measured as the natural logged
2000 BG population subtracted from 1990 BG population.6 It was hypothesized that a decrease in population
would be associated with an increase in violent and
property crime rates, thus, a negative association was
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expected.
The following variables represented economic
institutional predictors. Monetary aggravators were
dummy coded and measured as: 1 = one or more pawnshop or music CD-exchange establishment in BG, 0 = no
pawnshop or music CD-exchange establishment in BG.
This study extended the pawnshop argument to include
music CD-exchange stores. Music CD-exchange stores
trade and/or purchase merchandise (tapes, records, CDs)
from customers. These institutions are counterproductive because they attract “easy money” criminals that
reflect American culture’s reliance on unconventional
opportunities (i.e., the commission of crime) to acquire
materialistic goals (Glover and Larubia, 1996; Chamlin
and Cochran, 1995). Alcohol density was operationalized
as the number of alcohol establishments licensed for onsite consumption (e.g., bars, taverns, pubs, restaurants)
in each BG per 1,000 residents. It was hypothesized that
monetary aggravators and alcohol density would be positively associated with violent and property crime rates.
Noneconomic Institutional Independent Variables
The next set of variables represented noneconomic
institutions that were assumed to invoke values of restraint and reinforce norms of conformity.7 Welfare
generosity was measured as the total Section 8 housing
dollar voucher amounts per unit in BG. Church membership rate was operationalized as the number of registered
church members in each BG per 1,000 residents. To capture the unique experiences that Latino communities face,
the level of Spanish/English language usage was gauged
in terms of retaining or losing cultural traditions as a
group. Knowledge of the Spanish language is positively
related to integration with the traditional Latino culture
(Buriel, Calzada, and Vasquez, 1982), whereas Portes
and Rumbaut (1990) consider English language acquisition a fundamental process of becoming Americanized.8
Latino culture was operationalized as the percentage of
BG households linguistically isolated from the English
language as reflected in 2000 Census data. The aim was
to capture the level of households that speak Spanish
and have difficulty speaking English. BG households
characterized by higher levels of linguistic isolation from
the English language (i.e., more Spanish speaking Latino
households) were expected to be negatively associated
with crime. Finally, voter turnout rate was measured
as the number of voters that participated in the 2000
Presidential election in each BG per 1,000 residents.
Based on these noneconomic institutional variables,
the following hypotheses were specified. First, welfare
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generosity, church membership rate, Latino culture, and
voter turnout rate were expected to be negatively associated with the outcomes. Second, it was hypothesized
that welfare generosity, church membership rate, Latino
culture, and voter turnout rate would influence the impact of social disorganization and economic institutional
independent predictors on the outcomes. Lastly, and
consistent with the moderating focal point of institutional
anomie research, it was anticipated that all noneconomic
and concentrated disadvantage interaction terms (e.g.,
welfare generosity * concentrated disadvantage) would be
negatively associated with the outcomes. In keeping with
the institutional anomie spirit, it was hypothesized that
both economic and concentrated disadvantage interaction
terms (e.g., alcohol density* concentrated disadvantage) would be positively associated with the outcomes.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table
1. Appendix A provides a variable summary description
along with the hypothesized relationships.
Analytical Strategy and Findings
Three analytical strategies were employed. First,
bivariate correlations were estimated to: (a) determine
the preliminary relationships among the independent
and dependent variables, (b) gain a better understanding
between the theoretical social disorganization, economic,
and noneconomic independent relationships, and (c) address issues concerning multicollinearity. Next, Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate
several multivariate models. In the process, diagnostic
procedures were performed to further investigate multicollinearity, and tests for spatial autocorrelation were
conducted.
Due to the spatial nature of the data, contemporary

researchers advocate for the assessment of spatial autocorrelation (Alaniz et al., 1998; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a;
Messner et al., 2001; Nielsen and Martinez, 2003). Using
GeoDa software (Anselin, 2004), Moran’s I was used to
help detect whether spatial autocorrelation was present.
“Moran’s I is a cross-product coefficient similar to a
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and is bounded by 1 and
-1” (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003b:166). When Moran’s I is
significantly positive, positive spatial autocorrelation is
present. No evidence was found to indicate that property
(Moran’s I = .12; p > .19) and violent (Moran’s I = .10; p
>.11) crime rate in a given BG was spatially dependent on
adjacent BGs.9 Consistent with Reisig et al. (2004:262)
Moran’s I was also used to investigate whether the social
disorganization, economic and noneconomic independent
variables yielded any significant spill-over effect across
BGs. While none of the independent variables achieved
statistical significance, the largest Moran’s I coefficient
was observed for concentrated disadvantage (.18), followed by alcohol density (.15), and voter turnout rate
(-.12). Hence, no evidence of spill-over was detected.
Table 1 presents the bivariate correlations. Many of
the hypothesized relationships between the independent
and dependent variables were significant and in the expected direction. The general pattern of findings indicated
that as social disorganization and other economic institutional characteristics increased, violent and property crime
rates also increased. In contrast, as noneconomic social
control institutions increased, violent and property crime
rates decreased. In terms of relative magnitude, concentrated disadvantage yielded the strongest correlation for
violent crime rate, followed by alcohol density, percent
units vacant, population change, monetary aggravators,
and voter turnout rate. As for property crime rate, the
observed correlations were strongest for alcohol density,

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
(N=1,016)
X2
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
Y
Z

Concentrated disadvantagea
Percent units vacant
Percent male 15-29 yrs. of age
Population changeb
Monetary aggravators
Alcohol density
Welfare generosity
Church membership rate
Latino culture
Voter turnout rate
Violent crime rateb
Property crime rateb

X3

X4

.12 ** .13 ** -.09 **
.09 ** -.06
.00

X5

X6

X7

X8

X9

.04 ** .07 * -.20 ** -.06
.45
.00
.03
-.01
.10 ** .08
.11 ** -.09 ** .06
-.04
.11
-.06
-.10 ** .02
.05
-.15
.02
.09 ** .07 *
.04
-.03
.06
.03
-.02
.05
.04

X10

** -.30
*
-.08 *
** -.23 **
** .09 **
-.04
-.19 **
-.09 **
.04
-.17 **

Y
.48
.30
.07
-.23
.20
.41
-.09
-.06
-.10
-.15

Z

Mean

** .24 **
0.00
** .24 **
6.67
*
.03
10.79
** -.24 **
1.42
** .22 **
0.51
** .44 **
3.41
*
-.08 * 4777.28
-.14 *
35.09
*
-.09 *
15.56
** -.10 *
426.79
.53 **
1.70
3.94

SD
1.00
8.09
5.35
2.88
0.30
10.07
9197.33
45.50
10.36
555.23
0.78
1.23

a

Weighted factor score
Natural log
* p < .05
** p < .01
b
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concentrated disadvantage, percent units vacant, population change, monetary aggravators, and church membership rate. Concentrated disadvantage was positively associated with monetary aggravators and alcohol density
but negatively associated with welfare generosity, church
membership rate, and voter turnout rate. The observed
relationship for Latino culture showed that higher levels
of Spanish-speaking communities were disadvantaged
with low voter turnout rates. Overall, results indicated
that multicollinearity was not a problem; Pearson correlation values did not exceed .70.
Multivariate OLS Regression Results –
Property Crime Rate
When using small aggregates, Land, McCall, and
Cohen (1990) argued researchers need to carefully control for model specification and multicollinearity. The
large number of units of analysis (i.e., 1,016 census
BGs) created a large sample of aggregates, which in
turn allowed more macro-level predictors to be modeled
(Wooldredge, 2002). As a result, a total of 9 models were
estimated. Models 1 through 3 were additive, whereas
4 through 9 were multiplicative. According to Chamlin
and Cochran (1995), additive models have little bearing
on the evaluation of institutional anomie theory due to its
moderating principles. Instead, such an approach “serves
as a baseline for the determination of the contribution of
the joint influence [interaction] of economic conditions
and measures of noneconomic institutions on crime”
(Chamlin and Cochran, 1995:421). The potential for collinearity was investigated further using OLS regression
diagnostics. Results (not shown) provided additional
support that multicollinearity was not a problem. None
of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) exceeded 4.0.
Table 2 presents OLS regression models for property
crime rate. Model 1 examined whether social disorganization positively affected property crime rate. Consistent
with the social disorganization hypotheses, concentrated
disadvantage (.20) and percent units vacant (.20) were
significantly and positively associated with the outcome;
population change (-.21) showed a significant inverse
relationship. Model 1 accounted for 14 percent of the
explained variation. In Model 2, two economic institutional variables were included in the equation. The logic
was that an increase in unconventional institutions may
directly influence crime and further undermine levels of
social control. The findings indicated that alcohol density (.43), concentrated disadvantage (.22), monetary aggravators (.20), percent units vacant (.19), and a decrease
in population (-.16) increased property crime rates across
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BGs. The significant and positive association for alcohol
density and monetary aggravators support the economic
institutional hypotheses. The explained variation for
Model 2 (36%) was more than double the explained
variation in Model 1 (14%).
Model 3 examined whether an increase in norm
inducing noneconomic institutions: (a) were negatively
associated with property crime and (b) influenced the
impact of social disorganization and economic institutional conditions on the outcome. Welfare generosity
(-.09), church membership rate (-.07), and Latino culture
(-.09) were significantly and negatively associated with
property crime. While voter turnout rate (-.02) failed to
achieve statistical significance, its hypothesized association was confirmed. Next, the social disorganization and
economic institutional predictors were assessed to detect
attenuation in the model. For example, the coefficient
for concentrated disadvantage was reduced from .22 in
Model 2 to .12 in Model 3. Moreover, with the exception
of alcohol density, a slight reduction was observed across
the social disorganization and economic coefficients.
While the findings suggest theoretically that various
supportive and convention inducing institutions may
help relieve resource deficient communities in ways that
reduce crime, interpretation of the results from a purely
statistical perspective remains inconclusive since such
decline in magnitude of coefficients was not investigated
statistically. Nonetheless, the noneconomic institutional
hypotheses were partially supported.
In Models 4-9, estimating procedures allowed the
researchers to integrate both theoretical approaches by
examining whether: (a) interactions between concentrated
disadvantage and other crime prone economic institutional predictors were positively associated with property
crime, and (b) the influence of concentrated disadvantage
on the outcome was moderated by noneconomic institutions. One of the central debates among institutional anomie theorists (e.g., Maume and Lee, 2003:1155) is how to
best measure economic institutions in a way that captures
the institutional balance of power.10 Researchers have
remained committed to using variables such as poverty (a
deprivation measure) and Gini coefficient (an inequality
measure) to reflect the economy (Chamlin and Cochran,
1995; Maume and Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).11 In
doing so, scholars regularly calculate an interaction term
that includes poverty/Gini and some other noneconomic
institution. Rather than rely on a single measure that captures absolute poverty or its inequality continuum equivalent, the current research used concentrated disadvantage
rooted in the social disorganization tradition. Justification
for this approach is that (1) concentrated disadvantage is
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Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models for Property Crime Ratea
(N=1,016)
Model 1
�

Variable
Concentrated disadvantage

Model 2

a

Percent units vacant

Percent male 15-29 yrs. of age

Population changeb

Monetary aggravators

Alcohol density

�

Church membership rate

Latino culture

Voter turnout rate

Monetary aggravators * Con dis.

Model 4

�

Model 5

�

Model 6

�

Model 7

Model 8

�

�

Model 9

�

�

.20 ***

.22 ***

.12 ***

.13 ***

.15 ***

.15 ***

.12 ***

.18 ***

.13 ***

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

(.01)

[.07]

[.07]

[.04]

[.05]

[.05]

[.05]

[.04]

[.07]

[.05]

.20 ***

.19 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

.17 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

-.01

.01

.00

.00

.02

-.01

.00

-.01

.00

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[-.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[-.00]

[.00]

-.21 ***

-.16 ***

-.15 ***

-.15 ***

-.14 ***

-.15 ***

-.15 ***

-.15 ***

-.15 ***

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[-.02]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

—

—

.20 ***

.18 ***

.19 ***

.17 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

.18 ***

(.03)

(.03)

(.03)

(.03)

(.03)

(.03)

(.03)

(.03) ***

[.23]

[.21]

[.21]

[.20]

[.21]

[.21]

[.21]

[.21]

.43 ***

.44 ***

.43 ***

.45 ***

.43 ***

.41 ***

.43 ***

.43 ***

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.00]

[.00]
Welfare generosity

Model 3

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

-.09 *

-.09 *

-.09 *

-.10 *

-.09 *

-.09 *

-.09 *

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.08 *

-.08 *

-.08 *

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

-.09 *

-.09 *

-.04

-.09 *

-.09 *

-.10 *

-.10 *

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

-.02

-.02

-.04

-.02

-.02

-.01

-.04

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-.11 *

—

—

—

-.09 *

—

—

-.04

—

—

.10 *
(.03)
[.11]

Alcohol density * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

.19 ***
(.00)
[.00]

Welfare generosity * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

—

(.00)
[.00]
Church membership rate * Con dis

—

—

—

—

—

—

(.00)
[.00]
Latino culture * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

(.00)
[-.01]
Voter turnout rate * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-.05
(.00)
[.00]

Constant

3.163 *** 3.126 *** 3.107 *** 3.111 *** 3.112 *** 3.108 *** 3.104 *** 3.102 *** 3.107 ***

F-Statistic
R2

42.09 *** 95.56 *** 61.11 *** 55.83 *** 62.64 *** 56.58 *** 55.59 *** 56.60 *** 55.52 ***

a

.14

.36

.38

.38

.41

.38

.38

.38

.38

Weighted factor score

b

Natural log.

Standard errors in parentheses and unstandardized coefficients in brackets.

* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

77

An Ecological Assessment of Property and Violent Crime Rates Across a Latino Urban Landscape
considered a resource disadvantage measure that reflects
an assortment of community factors (Land et al., 1990;
Sampson and Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998), and (2) we seek to
integrate two theoretical perspectives. We are unaware of
existing studies that model concentrated disadvantage as
an interaction term.
To avoid problems with multicollinearity, interaction
terms were centered (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990).
This practice is consistent with much of the institutional
anomie research (e.g., Maume and Lee, 2003; Savolainen,
2000). The observed main effects across Models 4-9
showed little change, further suggesting no problems with
multicollinearity. Model 4 specified an interaction term
between monetary aggravators and concentrated disadvantage. This interaction term was significantly and positively associated (.06) with the outcome. Unsurprisingly,
Model 5 indicated that the interaction between alcohol
density and concentrated disadvantage was significant and
positively associated (.19) with property crime rate. Thus
far, BGs characterized by a combination of concentrated
resource disadvantage, pawn shops/music CD-exchange
stores, and alcohol density were directly associated with
the outcome.
Models 6-9 estimated interaction terms among
the noneconomic institutional characteristics (welfare
generosity, church membership rate, Latino culture,
voter turnout rate) and concentrated disadvantage. The
findings showed that rates of property crime were significantly and inversely associated with BGs with higher
levels of Section 8 welfare housing vouchers and church
membership rate. While interaction terms for Latino culture (-.04) and voter turnout rate (-.05) failed to achieve
significance, their hypothesized directional relationships
were supported. Overall, two of the four noneconomic
institutional interaction terms revealed evidence of moderating influences. In terms of explained variation, R2 for
the multiplicative models were 38 percent and 41 percent
respectively.
Multivariate OLS Regression Results –
Violent Crime Rate
Table 3 presents OLS regression models for violent
crime rate. Similar to the results in Table 2, many of the
specified hypotheses were supported, with three of the four
social disorganization predictors significantly associated
with violent crime. Concentrated disadvantage yielded
a much stronger positive (.44) correlation for violent
crime, when compared to property crime in Table 2. The
explained variation was a healthy 32 percent. In Model
2, monetary aggravators and alcohol density results also
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mirrored those from Table 2. However, the coefficient
for monetary aggravators (.16) in the violent crime model
was weaker, when compared to the same model (.20) in
the previous table. Perhaps pawnshops and music CDexchange stores were positively associated more with
property than violent crime. Nonetheless, the economic
institutional hypotheses were confirmed to be positively
associated with the outcome. More interestingly, Model
2 showed more than half (52%) of the variation in violent
crime rate was explained.
When noneconomic institutional variables were entered in Model 3, welfare generosity (-.07), Latino culture
(-.10), and voter turnout rate (-.08) were significant and
negatively associated with violent crime. These findings
are slightly different when compared to property crime
Model 3 in Table 2. For example, church membership
rate was unrelated to violent crime, but significantly and
inversely associated to property crime. Furthermore,
voter turnout rate was significant and inversely related
to violent crime, but unrelated to property crime. Two
possible explanations for such discrepancies were that
some scholars posit violent crime should not be linked
to dimensions of religion because of the impulsive and
emotional nature of such crimes (Bainbridge, 1989; Stark,
1987); and communities characterized by higher levels of
voters are less likely to tolerate violence, thereby taking
an active and more collective role in expressing disapproval (Messner et al., 2004). After controlling for the
noneconomic institutions, the observed coefficient for
concentrated disadvantage (.40) showed a slight reduction. Model 3 partially supported the hypotheses for
the noneconomic variables, explaining 54 percent of the
variation in violent crime rate.
In Models 4-9 for violent crime, a different pattern
of results emerged when compared to models for property crime in Table 2. Despite their directional accuracy,
Models 4 and 7 indicated that a combination of monetary
aggravators and concentrated disadvantage (.05) and
church membership and concentrated disadvantage (-.09)
were unrelated to violent crime. In Models 8 and 9, the
combination of Latino culture and concentrated disadvantage (-.12) and voter turnout rate and concentrated disadvantage (-.10) were significant and negatively associated
with violent crime; but in Table 2 these interaction terms
were unrelated. In essence, BGs characterized by concentrated disadvantage and alcohol density experienced
more violent crime; less violent crime was observed in
BGs characterized by concentrated disadvantage, welfare
generosity, households that speak Spanish and have difficulty with English, and higher voter turnout. The mixed
results seen for Latino culture might suggest Latino
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Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models for Violent Crime Ratea
(N=1,016)
Model 1

Concentrated disadvantage

a

Percent units vacant

Percent male 15-29 yrs. of age

Population changeb

Monetary aggravators

Alcohol density

Model 2

�

�

.44 ***

.45 ***

Variable

Church membership rate

Latino culture

Voter turnout rate

Monetary aggravators * Con dis.

Model 4

�
.40 ***

Model 5

�
.36 ***

Model 6

�
.36 ***

Model 7

�
.38 ***

Model 8

�
.35 ***

Model 9

�
.42 ***

�
.41 ***

-(.01)

(.00)

-(.01)

-(.01)

-(.01)

-(.01)

-(.01)

-(.01)

-(.01)

[.13]

[.14]

[.10]

[.11]

[.11]

[.11]

[.11]

[.13]

[.12]

.23 ***

.22 ***

.21 ***

.21 ***

.20 ***

.21 ***

.20 ***

.20 ***

.21 ***

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

[.01]

-.01

.01

.00

.00

.01

.00

.01

-.01

-.01

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

-.18 ***

-.13 ***

-.11 ***

-.11 ***

-.11 ***

-.11 ***

-.11 ***

-.11 ***

-.12 ***

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

[-.01]

—

—

.16 ***

—

—

—

—

—

.15 ***

.15 ***

.14 ***

.14 ***

.15 ***

.15

.15 ***

-(.02)

-(.02)

-(.02)

-(.02)

-(.02)

-(.02)

-(.02)

-(.02)

[.16]

[.14]

[.15]

[.14]

[.14]

[.15]

[.15]

[.15]

.42 ***

.45 ***

.44 ***

.45 ***

.44 ***

.40 ***

.44 ***

.42 ***

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.01]

[.00]
Welfare generosity

Model 3

—

—

—

—

—

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.08 *

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.07 **

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

-.05

-.05

-.05

-.05

-.05

-.05

-.05

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

-.10 *

-.09 *

-.09 *

-.10 *

-.09 *

.11 *

-.10 *

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)
[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

[.00]

[.00]

[.01]

-.08 *

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.07 *

-.08 *

-.07 *

-.09 *

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

(.00)

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

[.00]

—

.05

----

----

----

—

—

----

----

—

—

-.09 *

----

—

—

-.03

—

—

-.12 *

—

-(.02)
[.05]
Alcohol density * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

.16 ***
(.00)
[.00]

Welfare generosity * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

—

(.00)
[.00]
Church membership rate * Con dis

—

—

—

—

—

—

(.00)
[.00]
Latino culture * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

(.00)
[-.01]
Voter turnout rate * Con dis.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-.10 *
(.00)
[.00]

Constant

1.396 *** 1.356 *** 1.307 *** 1.308 *** 1.300 *** 1.310 *** 1.308 *** 1.317 *** 1.363 ***

F-Statistic
R2

117.9 *** 181.2 *** 117.0 *** 107.2 *** 110.2 *** 108.4 *** 107.0 *** 110.3 *** 109.1 ***

a

.32

.52

.54

.54

.55

.54

.54

.55

.55

Weighted factor score

b

Natural log.

Standard errors in parentheses and unstandardized coefficients in brackets.
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001
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Spanish speaking households reflect immigrant communities that are capable of warding off violent crime, but
not property crime. In fact, San Antonio ranks second
behind San Diego with the lowest violent crime rate in
the U.S. Thus, there is much more to be said and measured about the Latino experience, other than traditional
measures such as ethnicity and race (Sampson et al.,
2005). Overall, these findings suggest some moderating
influence and partially support the directional accuracy of
the interaction term hypotheses. The explained variation
for Models 4-9 were 54 percent and 55 percent.
Multivariate OLS Regression Results – Summary
In summary, OLS regression results showed five
general patterns of findings. First, social disorganization determinants, especially concentrated disadvantage,
behaved consistent with previous research. Second,
monetary aggravators and alcohol density appeared to
make community matters worse by intensifying violent
crime more than property crime. Third, noneconomic institutional characteristics seem to adequately relieve the
adverse social disorganization and economic institutional
influences on crime. Fourth, the interactions between concentrated disadvantage and several of the economic and
noneconomic variables produced a mixed set of findings.
Interactions between alcohol density and concentrated
disadvantage, however, were significant and positively
associated with both outcomes; interactions between welfare generosity and concentrated disadvantage were also
significant and negatively associated with both outcomes.
Fifth, the models revealed moderate to strong explained
variation. Overall, the empirical evidence provides some
merit to the proposed theoretical integration of social disorganization and institutional anomie, warranting further
research.12
Discussion and Conclusion
The current study incorporated the theories of social
disorganization and institutional anomie. The former
was employed to tackle the demographic structure; the
latter was enlisted to capture various types of institutions.
Taking this approach remains attentive to the wide range
of positive and negative community forces associated
with crime and explores the conditional nature of crime.
For example, the estimated interaction terms allowed
the integration of both theories while testing whether
substantive connections existed at the census block group
level. Based on the findings, both theories can be viewed
as supplementary in order to provide a more refined
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picture that explains crime. The findings extend the understanding of these theories when conceptualized on a
community continuum. At one end, more traditional demographic structures exist; at the opposite end, economic
and noneconomic institutions are present. As researchers
begin to identify and operationalize demographic and
institutional forces more likely to be associated with
crime, they can begin to assess the interdependent nature
of these ecological characteristics. This process adds to
the theoretical viability and utility of each.
The Latino culture findings showed a significant
negative association for property and violent crime; but
the concentrated disadvantage-Latino culture interaction
term suggested a tolerance for property crime and not
violent crime. These mixed results add to an ongoing debate whether the Latino experience, in its various forms,
impedes or improves community crime. Researchers
have posited two divergent perspectives. Sampson et
al. (1997:920) reported that higher rates of immigration
undermine the capacity of residents to realize common
values and to achieve informal social control due to ethnic
and linguistic heterogeneity in Chicago (see also Flippen,
2001:301). However, in a more recent study, Sampson
et al. (2005) found that lower rates of violence among
Latinos, compared to Whites and Blacks, were explained
by immigrant concentration.
Martinez’s (2002) work also cast doubt on the
hypothesis that immigration is associated with crime.
Immigration may affect poor Latino neighborhoods positively by helping revitalize areas, strengthening traditional
social controls, and creating new community institutions
(Elliot and Sims, 2001:344; Buriel et al., 1982), which
in turn reduce the likelihood of crime. Scribner (1996)
posits that immigrants are generally found to do as well
and sometimes better than American citizens. Hagan and
Palloni (1999:631) argue future research should focus
on the culture and religion of Mexican communities in a
manner that emphasizes “ways to preserve, protect, and
promote the social and cultural capital that Mexican immigrants bring to their experience in the United States.”
This research sought to study the Latino experience with
the goal of bringing Latinos to the criminological forefront and, in the process, move beyond the White/Black
urban crime focus.
The implications of these findings are persuasive
enough for rethinking how city officials should plan,
implement, and coordinate economic and noneconomic
development activities. On one hand, this study identified
types of criminogenic economic institutions that officials
might regulate more closely. For example, the fact that
monetary aggravators and alcohol density were positively
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associated with violent and property crime signals the
need for regulation of such institutions through zoning.
On the other hand, the study also identified noneconomic
crime stabilizing mechanisms of social control in which
officials might further invest or re-invest. Zoning and
land use decisions are likely to have salient consequences
(Bursik and Grasmick, 1993:53-55). Land use variables
have been found to be an important correlate of crime
(e.g., Peterson et al., 2000; Smith, Frazee, and Davison,
2000). By zoning, the goal is to improve the economic,
social, cultural, and political efficacy among residents
for the purpose of establishing community normative
order. According to Kubrin and Weitzer (2003a:385), it
“is axiomatic that the priorities and decisions of municipal government officials and business interest can have
major effects on a neighborhood’s quality of life and that
neighborhoods vary in their capacity to secure valued
city services, but we are only beginning to understand
how this influences crime.” Few studies have examined
how external political decision making influences crime
(Stark, 1987; Stucky, 2003; Velez, 2001; Wilson, 1996).
With this said, however, there are three research limitations. The first limitation bears directly on the aforementioned policies. The cross sectional data preclude
definitive statements about causal linkages between the
independent measures and outcomes. For example, it is
unclear whether crime attracts bars or vise versa. If crime
is already present, zoning may not matter because bars are
an extension of communities, not the cause. This analysis
reinforces the notion that the community-crime path is far
from unidirectional and suggests that a complex relationship exists. To better isolate causality, future studies may
seek to utilize cross sectional data yet employ more sophisticated LISREL simultaneous equation strategies that
specify recursive and nonrecursive models (Markowitz
et al., 2001; see also Bellair, 2000). The second shortcoming was that the researchers were unable to measure
key social disorganization mechanisms of social control,
such as collective efficacy. Third, as mentioned earlier,
we were unable to determine whether the reduction in
magnitude of social disorganization and economic institutional coefficients in Models 3 for property and violent
crime rate were statistically significant; which in turn,
rendered the evidence inconclusive that mediation exists.
Despite these drawbacks, this research has answered the
call of previous scholarship (e.g., Morenoff et al., 2001)
suggesting that future ecological studies examine more
objective institutional measures similar to those used by
Peterson et al. (2000). In so doing, we are optimistic that
the greatest prospect for these ecological perspectives is
their role and utility toward theoretical integration.

Endnotes
1. The authors thank Richard Rosenfeld and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2. There is debate regarding the extent to which institutional anomie applies to violent or property crimes,
or both.
3. Justification for this census item is that it “incorporates the level of English-language interaction for an
entire household and subsumes important components of
contextual census variables such as nativity and length of
time in country” (Finch et al., 2000:429).
4. They argue that it is inappropriate to focus exclusively on the direct relationship between economic and
noneconomic structures and crime.
5. They also found that the economy (i.e., Gini coefficient of family inequality) was positively and significantly related to various homicide outcomes. Second, noneconomic familial divorce rate was positively and significantly related with homicide; voter turnout, civically engaged adherents, and welfare expenditure were negatively and significantly associated with homicides. In general, voter turnout was responsible for significantly attenuating the effect of economy on homicides. Magnitudes of
the coefficients were largest for familial divorce rate, followed by voter turnout, civically engaged adherents, and
welfare expenditure.
6. Population change represents the absolute increase
or decrease in actual population. The variable can range
from negative to positive infinity. The natural log can
only be computed for positive integers. To account for
this, computing the natural log of the absolute value normalized the variable. Once computed, the direction of the
natural log value was changed to negative where a population decrease was experienced.
7. While “direct measures of the extent to which
noneconomic institutions provide alternative definitions
of self-worth that could serve as countervailing forces
against the anomie produced by the unbridled pursuit of
the American Dream are not available,” the presumption
here is that “certain structural arrangements [e.g., church
membership] are more likely than others [e.g., pawnshops/music CD-exchange stores] to promulgate nonmaterialistic values” (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995:417).
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8. Prior research has estimated various aspects of
the Latino culture as an intervening and moderating variable (Cuellar, Arnold, and Maldonado, 1995; Rogler et
al., 1991:590).

Anderson, Nancy and Orlando Rodriguez.
1984.
“Conceptual Issues in the Study of Hispanic
Delinquency.”
Fordham University Hispanic
Research Center Research Bulletin 7:2-8.

9. The spatial weight matrix was based on rook contiguity. Rook is defined as two neighbors (e.g., census
block groups) sharing a common boundary at the edge.
Only those cells having a rook’s contiguous relation were
assigned a value of 1.

Anselin, Luc. 2004. “GeoDa.” Council for Spatially
Integrated Social Science. Urbana-Champaign, IL:
University of Illinois.

10. “For example, using macro-level data, how does
one measure the dominance of the economy in the institutional balance of power, the effectiveness of noneconomic institutional controls, or anomie?” (Chamlin and
Cochran, 1995:415).
11. Cochran et al. (1995) estimated poverty in their
primary models, but also substituted poverty with the
Gini coefficient to determine differential effects. The
outcome yielded similar results. In contrast, Maume and
Lee (2003) estimated the Gini coefficient in their original
model, but then substituted the Gini coefficient with poverty. Maume and Lee (2003:1154) also reported that the
results were “identical to the ones [with the Gini coefficient].” The lack of variation in results is perhaps due to
the fact that such concepts are theoretically distinct, but
may share similar qualities when operationalized.
12. As one reviewer suggested, results should be interpreted with caution since concentrated disadvantage:
(1) includes outputs of the economy (poverty and unemployment) as well as family structure (female-headed households with children) and (2) incorporates Latino
population which makes interpretation of the net effect of
Latino culture less precise.
References
Alaniz, Maria L., Randi S. Cartmill and Robert N. Parker.
1998. “Immigrants and Violence: The Importance
of Neighborhood Context.” Hispanic Journal of
Behavioral Sciences 20:155-174.
Allen, James P. and Eugene Turner. 2005. “Ethnic
Residential Concentrations in United States
Metropolitan Areas.” The Geographical Review 95:
267-285.

82

Bainbridge, William S. 1989. “The Religious Ecology of
Deviance.” American Sociological Review 54:288295.
Bellair, Paul E. 2000. “Informal Surveillance and Street
Crime: A Complex Relationship.” Criminology
38:137-167.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Martin J. Osborne. 1995.
“Crime, Punishment and Social Expenditure.”
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
106:326-347.
Bernburg, Jon Gunnar. 2002. “Anomie, Social Change,
and Crime: A Theoretical Examination of Institutional
Anomie Theory.” British Journal of Criminology
4:729-742.
Browning, Christopher R., Seth L. Feinburg and
Robert D. Dietz. 2004. “The Paradox of Social
Disorganization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, and
Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods.” Social
Problems 83:503-534.
Buriel, Raymond, Silverio Calzada and Richard Vasquez.
1982. “The Relationship of Traditional Mexican
American Culture to Adjustment and Delinquency
among Three Generations of Mexican American
Male Adolescents. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral
Sciences 4:41-55.
Bursik, Robert J. Jr. and Harold G. Grasmick. 1993.
Neighborhoods and Crime.
New York, NY:
Lexington Books.
Chamlin, Mitchell B. and John K. Cochran. 1995.
“Assessing Messner and Rosenfeld’s Institutional
Anomie Theory: A Partial Test.” Criminology
33:411-429.

Cancino, et al. / Western Criminology Review 8(1), 69–87 (2007)
Chung, Chanjin and Samuell L. Myers Jr. 1999. “Do The
Poor Pay More for Food? An Analysis of Grocery
Store Availability and Food Price Disparities.”
Journal of Consumer Affairs 33:276-296.

Guzman, Betsy. 2001. Census 2000 Brief: The Hispanic
Population. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration.
Government Printing Office.

Cuellar, Israel, Bill Arnold and Roberto Maldonado.
1995. “Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican
Americans-II: A Revision of the Original ARSMA
Scale.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences
17:275-304.

Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena.
2001.
“Alcohol
Availability and Crime: Evidence from Census Tract
Data.” Southern Economic Journal 68:2-21.

Duncan, Greg J. and Lawrence J. Aber.
1997.
“Neighborhood Models and Measures.” Pp. 62-78 in
Neighborhood Poverty: Context and Consequences
for Children, edited by J. Brooks-Gunn, G. J.
Duncan, and L. J. Aber. New York, NY: Russell
Sage Foundation.
Eaton, Curtis B. and William D. White. 1991. “The
Distribution of Wealth and the Efficiency of
Institutions.” Economic Inquiry 29:336-350.

Hagan, John and Alberto Palloni. 1999. “Sociological
Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic
Immigration and Crime.” Social Problems 46:617632.
Hunt, Monica O. 2000. “Status, Religion, and the Belief
in a Just World: Comparing African Americans,
Latinos, and Whites.” Social Science Quarterly 81:
325-343.

Elliot, James R. and Mario Sims. 2001. “Ghettos and
Barrios: The Impact of Neighborhood Poverty and
Race on Job Matching among Blacks and Latinos.”
Social Problems 48:341-361.

Hunter, Albert Jr. 1985. “Private, Parochial and
Public School Orders: The Problem of Crime and
Incivility in Urban Communities.” Pp. 230-242 in
The Challenge of Social Control: Citizenship and
Institution Building in Modern Society, edited by
G. D. Suttles and M. N. Zald. Norwood, NJ: Ablex
Publishing.

Fass, Simon M. and Janice Francis. 2004. “Where Have
All the Hot Goods Gone? The Role of Pawnshops.”
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
41:156-179.

Jaccard, James, Robert Turrisi and Choi K. Won.
1990. Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Finch, Brian, Jason D. Boardman, Bohdan Kolody and
William S. Vega. 2000. “Contextual Effects of
Acculturation on Perinatal Substance Exposure
among Immigrant and Native-Born Latinas.” Social
Science Quarterly 81:421-438.

Kasarda, John and Morris Janowitz. 1974. “Community
Attachment in Mass Society.” American Sociological
Review 39:328-339.

Flippen, Chenoa. 2001. “Neighborhood Transition and
Social Organization: The White to Hispanic case.”
Social Problems 48:299-321.
Goering, John M. and Judith D. Feins. 2003. Choosing
a Better Life? Evaluating the Moving to Opportunity
Social Experiment. Washington, DC: Urban Institute
Press.
Glover, Sandy and Eric Larubia. 1996. “A System in
Hock: Quick Cash with Few Questions.” South
Florida Sun-Sentinel, 24 November, 22A.

Kornhauser, Ruth. 1978. Social Sources of Delinquency.
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
Kubrin, Charis E. and Ronald Weitzer. 2003a. “New
Directions in Social Disorganization Theory.”
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
40:374-402.
Kubrin, Charis E. and Ronald Weitzer.
2003b.
“Retaliatory Homicide: Concentrated Disadvantage
and Neighborhood Culture.”
Social Problems
50:157-180.

83

An Ecological Assessment of Property and Violent Crime Rates Across a Latino Urban Landscape
Land, Kenneth C., Patricia L. McCall and Lawrence E.
Cohen. 1990. “Structural Covariates of Homicide
Rates: Are There Any Invariances across Time and
Social Space?” American Journal of Sociology
92:922-963.
Lee, Michael. 1998. Drowning in Alcohol: Retail Outlet
Density, Economic Decline, and Revitalization in
South Los Angeles. San Rafael, CA: Marin Institute
for the Prevention of Alcohol and Other Drug
Problems.
Lynch, James P. and David Cantor. 1992. “Ecological
and Behavioral Influences on Property Victimization
at Home: Implications for Opportunity Theory.”
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
29:355-362.

Messner, Steven F., Eric P. Baumer and Richard Rosenfeld.
2004. “Dimensions of Social Capital and Rates of
Criminal Homicide.” American Sociological Review
69:882-903.
Messner, Steven F. and Reid M. Golden. 1992. “Racial
Inequality and Racially Disaggregated Homicide
Rates: An Assessment of Alternative Theoretical
Explanations.” Criminology 30:421-447.
Messner, Steven F. and Richard Rosenfeld. 1994.
Crime and the American Dream. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Messner, Steven F. and Richard Rosenfeld. 1997.
“Political Restraint of the Market and Levels of
Criminal Homicide: A Cross National Application
of Institutional Anomie Theory. Social Forces
75:1393-1416.

Markowitz, Fred E., Paul E. Bellair, Allen E. Liska
and Jianhong Liu. 2001. “Extending Social
Disorganization Theory: Modeling the Relationships
between Cohesion, Disorder, and Fear.” Criminology
39:293-319.

Messner, Steven F. and Richard Rosenfeld. 2001.
Crime and the American Dream. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.

Martinez, Ramiro Jr.
2002.
Latino Homicide:
Immigration, Violence, and Community. New York,
NY: Routledge.

Miethe, Terance D. and David McDowall. 1993.
“Contextual Effects in Models of Criminal
Victimization.” Social Forces 71:741-759.

Maume, Michael O. and Matthew R. Lee. 2003. “Social
Institutions and Violence: A Sub-national Test of
Institutional Anomie Theory.” Criminology 41:137171.

Morenoff, Jeffrey D. and Robert J. Sampson. 1997.
“Violent Crime and the Spatial Dynamics of
Neighborhood Transition: Chicago, 1970-1990.”
Social Forces 76:31-64.

McNulty, Thomas L. and Steven R. Holloway. 2000.
“Race, Crime, and Public Housing in Atlanta: Testing
a Conditional Effect Hypothesis.” Social Forces
79:707-729.

Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson and Stephen
W. Raudenbush. 2001. “Neighborhood Inequality,
Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of
Urban Violence.” Criminology 39:517-559.

Merton, Robert. 1938. “Social Structure and Anomie.”
American Sociological Review 3: 672-682.

Nielsen, Amie L. and Ramiro Martinez Jr. 2003.
“Reassessing the Alcohol-Violence Linkage: Results
from a Multiethnic City.” Justice Quarterly 20:445469.

Messner, Steven F., Luc Anselin, Robert D. Baller, Darnell
F. Hawkins, Glenn Deane and Stewart E. Tolnay.
2001. “The spatial Patterning of County Homicide
Rates: An Application of Exploratory Spatial
Analysis.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology
15:423-450.

Peterson, Ruth D., Lauren J. Krivo and Mark A. Harris.
2000. “Disadvantage and Neighborhood Violent
Crime: Do Local Institutions Matter?” Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency 37:31-63.
Portes, Alejandro and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 1990.
Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkely, CA:
University of California Press.

84

Cancino, et al. / Western Criminology Review 8(1), 69–87 (2007)
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse
and Revival of American Community. New York,
NY: Simon and Schuster.

Sampson, Robert J. 1987. “Urban Black Violence: The
Effects of Male Joblessness and Family Disruption.”
American Journal of Sociology 93:348-382.

Quimet, Marc. 2000. “Aggregation Bias in Ecological
Research: How Social Disorganization and Criminal
Opportunities Shape the Spatial Distribution of
Juvenile Delinquency in Montreal.” Canadian
Journal of Criminology 42:135-156.

Sampson, Robert J. and W. Byron Groves. 1989.
“Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social
Disorganization Theory.” American Journal of
Sociology 94:774-802.

Reisig, Michael D., John D. McCluskey, Stephen D.
Mastrofski and William Terrill. 2004. “Suspect
Disrespect toward the Police.” Justice Quarterly
21:241-268.
Rogler, Lloyd H., Dharma E. Cortes and Robert G.
Malgady. 1991. “Acculturation and Mental Health
Status among Hispanics: Convergence and New
Directions for Research.” American Psychologist
46:585-597.
Roncek, Dennis W. and Ralph Bell. 1981. “Bars, Blocks,
and Crime.” Journal of Environmental Systems
11:35-47.
Roncek, Dennis W. and Pamela A. Maier. 1991. “Bars,
Blocks, and Crimes Revisited: Linking the Theory of
Routine Activities to the Empiricism of Hot Spots.”
Criminology 29:725-753.
Roncek, Dennis W. and Mitchell A. Pravatiner. 1989.
“Additional Evidence That Taverns Enhance Nearby
Crime.” Sociology and Social Research 73:185188.
Rosenfeld, Richard, Steven F. Messner and Eric P.
Baumer. 2001. “Social Capital and Homicide.”
Social Forces 80:283-309.
Rountree, Pamela, Wilcox Kenneth Land and Terrance
D. Miethe. 1994. “Macro-Micro Integration in
the Study of Victimization: A Hierarchical Logistic
Model Analysis Across Seattle Neighborhoods.”
Criminology 32:387-414.
Sampson, Robert J. 1985. “Race and Criminal Violence:
A Demographically Disaggregated Analysis of Urban
Homicide.” Crime and Delinquency 31:47-82.

Sampson, Robert J. and Dawn Jeglum-Bartusch. 1998.
“Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of
Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial
Differences.” Law and Society Review 32:777-804.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff and Felton Earls.
1999. “Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics
of Collective Efficacy for Children.” American
Sociological Review 64:633-660.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff and Stephen W.
Raudenbush. 2005. “Social Anatomy of Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Violence.” American Journal
of Public Health 95:224-232.
Sampson, Robert J. and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 1999.
“Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A
New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods.”
American Journal of Sociology 105:603-651.
Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush and Felton
Earls. 1997. “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime:
A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science
277:918-924.
Savolainen, Jukka. 2000. “Inequality, Welfare State,
and Homicide: Further Support for the Institutional
Anomie Theory.” Criminology 38:1021-1042.
Scribner, Richard. 1996. “Editorial: Paradox as Paradigm
-- The Health Outcomes of Mexican Americans.”
American Journal of Public Health 86:303-304.
Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry D. McKay. 1942. Juvenile
Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press.
Simcha-Fagan, Ora and Joseph E. Schwartz. 1986.
“Neighborhood and Delinquency: An Assessment of
Contextual Effects.” Criminology 24:667-703.

85

An Ecological Assessment of Property and Violent Crime Rates Across a Latino Urban Landscape
Smith, Douglas A. and G. Roger Jarjoura. 1989.
“Household
Characteristics,
Neighborhood
Composition and Victimization Risk.” Social Forces
68:621-640.
Smith, William R., Sharon G. Frazee and Elizabeth L.
Davison. 2000. “Furthering the Integration of Routine
Activity and Social Disorganization Theories: Small
Units of Analysis and the Study of Street Robbery as
a Diffusion Process.” Criminology 38:489-523.
Stark, Rodney. 1996. “Religion as Context: Hellfire
and Delinquency One More Time.” Sociology of
Religion 2:163-173.
Stark, Rodney. 1987. “Deviant Places: A Theory of the
Ecology of Crime.” Criminology 25: 893-909.
Stark, Rodney, William S. Bainbridge and Robert D.
Crutchfield. 1983. “Crime and Delinquency in the
Roaring Twenties.” Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 20:4-23.
Stucky, Thomas D. 2003. “Local Politics and Violent
Crime in U.S. Cities.” Criminology 41:1101-1134.
Vega, William A. and Andres G. Gil. 1998. Drug Use
and Ethnicity in Early Adolescence. New York, NY:
Plenum Press.
Velez, Maria B. 2001. “The role of Public Social
Control in Urban Neighborhoods.” Criminology 39:
837-863.

Warner, Barbara D. 2003. “The Role of Attenuated
Culture in Social Disorganization Theory.”
Criminology 41:73-97.
Warner, Stephen R. 1993. “Work in Progress Toward
a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of
Religion in the United States.” American Journal of
Sociology 98:1004-1093.
Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged:
The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, William Julius. 1996. When Work Disappears:
The World of the New Urban Poor. New York, NY:
Vintage Books.
Wooldredge, John. 2002. “Examining the (Ir)Relevance
of Aggregation Bias for Multilevel Studies of
Neighborhoods and Crime with an Example
Comparing Census Tracts to Official Neighborhoods
in Cincinnati.” Criminology 40:681-709.
Wright, Richard and Scott H. Decker. 1993. Exploring
the House Burglar’s Perspective: Observing and
Interviewing Offenders in St. Louis, 1980-1990
[Computer file]. St. Louis, MO: Richard Wright
and Scott H. Decker [producers]. Ann Arbor, MI:
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research [distributor].
Zhang, Junsen. 1997. “The Effects of Welfare Programs
on Criminal Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis.” Economic Inquiry 35:120-137.

About the authors:
Jeffrey Michael Cancino is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Texas State University-San Marcos. His
research interests include police culture, social disorganization theory, homicide, and Latino studies. Recent publications have appeared in Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, Homicide Studies,
the Journal of Criminal Justice, and Criminal Justice Policy Review.
Sean Patrick Varano is an Assistant Professor in the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University. His
research interests include juvenile justice policy, homicide reduction strategies, and aspects of technology in the
criminal justice system. Publications have appeared in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Homicide
Studies, and Criminal Justice Policy Review.
Joseph A. Schafer is an Associate Professor in the Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency & Corrections at
Southern Illinois University Carbondale. His research interests include police decision making in traffic stops, community policing, and perceptions of the police. Recent publications have also appeared in Police Quarterly, Policing:
An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, and Journal of Criminal Justice.

86

Cancino, et al. / Western Criminology Review 8(1), 69–87 (2007)
Roger Enriquez is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Texas-San
Antonio. His research interests include indigent defense among Latinos and Police/Latino community relations.
Recent publications have appeared in Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management and
Gender Race and Justice.
Contact information:
Jeffrey Michael Cancino (corresponding author): Department of Criminal Justice, Texas State University-San
Marcos, 601 University Drive, San Marcos, Texas 78666; jc68@txstate.edu.
Sean Patrick Varano: College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University, 204 Churchhill Hall, Boston, MA 02115;
s.varano@neu.edu.
Joseph A. Schafer: Center for the Study of Crime, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Mailcode 4504,
Carbondale, IL 62901-4505; jschafer@siu.edu.
Roger Enriquez: Department of Criminal Justice, University of Texas-San Antonio, 501 West Durango Blvd., San
Antonio, TX 78207; renriquez@utsa.edu.
Appendix A. Operational Definitions of Dependent and
Independent Variables and Hypothesized Relationships
Variable

+/-

Operational definition

Violent crime rate

Three year (2001-2003) average of homicide, rape, robbery, and assault (simple and
aggravated) in each BG per 1,000 population. Natural logs were computed to
normalize the distribution.

Property crime rate

Three year (2001-2003) average of serious property crime (auto theft, residential
burglary, and vehicular burglary) in each BG per 1,000 population. Natural logs were
computed to normalize the distribution.

Concentrated disadvantage

+

Weighted factor regression score that included the following 2000 Census items:
percent poverty, percent unemployment, percent female-headed household with
children, percent Latino, and to a lesser extent, percent Black.

Percent units vacant

+

Percent BG housing units vacant.

Percent males 15-29 years o

+

Percent BG population males between ages 15-29.

Population change

-

Natural logged 2000 BG population subtracted from 1990 BG population.

Monetary aggravators

+

1 = One or more pawnshop or music CD-exchange store establishment in BG.
0 = No pawnshop or music CD-exchange store establishment in BG.

Alcohol density

+

Number of on-site (in-house) consumption alcohol establishments (e.g., bars, taverns,
pubs, restaurants) in each BG per 1,000 population.

Welfare generosity

-

Total Section 8 housing dollar voucher amounts per unit in BG.

Church membership rate

-

Number of registered church members in each BG per 1,000 population.

Latino culture

-

Percent BG households linguistically isolated. The census defines “linguistically
isolated” household as those in which no person 14 years old and over speaks only
English and no person 14 years old and over who speaks a language other than English
speaks English "Very well".

Voter turnout rate

-

Number of participated voters in each BG per 1,000 population.
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